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Over a decade ago, the Federal Judicial Conference warned of an
asbestos litigation "disasterof major proportions."' The Supreme Court of
the United States has described the litigation as a "crisis."2 According to
the RAND Institute for Civil Justice ("RAND"), by the end of 2000, more
than 600,000 asbestos claims were filed.3 RAND estimates that as many as
three million more plaintiffs may eventually file claims. Most new claimants
are not sick.4 The flood of claims has forced almost sixty companies into
bankruptcy;5 many of these bankruptcies are very recent. As a result,
defendants with only remote connections to asbestos-known as peripheral
defendants-are being dragged into the litigation. Some of these companies
have also begun to declare bankruptcy. Experts predict that, absent
meaningful reform, asbestos cases may continue to be a major legal and
public policy problemfor decades to come. In this article, the author argues
that courts and legislatures should impose ad hoc public policy limitations
on joint liability in asbestos and other appropriate cases. The article
analyzes holdings that support asbestos-specific limits on joint liability, and
explains why unlimited and unrestrainedjoint liability represents unsound
public policy in the current asbestos litigation environment. The article
concludes that limits on joint liability in asbestos cases are supported by
sound public policy and would help mitigate the litigationcrisis.
Aesop's fable about killing the goose that laid the golden eggs 6 does not
quite fit the present state of asbestos litigation. If Aesop were alive today,
he might write about lawyers killing the prized goose, and then searching out
and killing ever more dissimilar birds who also lay golden eggs - perhaps a
golden egg-laying duck, then a chicken, followed by a pigeon, a sparrow,
and finally, perhaps, a golden egg-laying hummingbird. Eventually, a large
number of egg-laying birds would be gone or facing the threat of extinction.
That story would describe what is happening today in asbestos litigation.'

1. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283 Before the

House Comm. on the Judiciaroyu. 106th Cong. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Edley Testimony] (Statement of
Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School).
2. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
3.

STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ASBESTOS LITIGATION

COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 49 (2002) [hereinafter RAND Rep.]

4. Id. at 77.
5. Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now? Part Two: A Continuing History of the
Companies that Have Sought Bankruptcy Protection Due to Asbestos Claims, 17-20 MEALY'S
LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS 1 (2002).
6. See AESOP, The Goose that Laid the Golden Eggs, reprinted in THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: A
TREASURE OF GREAT MORAL STORIES 47 (William J. Bennett, ed. 1993) (A farmer had a goose that
began laying one solid gold egg each day, which the farmer sold. The farmer decided he wanted to
get all the gold the goose had inside it, so he killed the goose and opened it only to find nothing.).
7. See generally Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts'
Duty to Help Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6-6 BRIEFLY 2 (2002) (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the
Pub. Interest Monograph), available at <http://www.nlcpi.org> (last visited June 3, 2003); Mark A.
Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious
Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts
Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001).
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I. THE ASBESTOS CRISIS

Before the 1970s, large numbers of American workers were exposed to
asbestos in industrial and other work settings, some for long periods of time
and at high levels. With the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act in 1970, increasingly strict regulations governing workplace exposures
to asbestos were put into place.8 The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) promulgated its first limitations on the use of
asbestos in 197 1,' and in short order further restricted the product until it
was effectively precluded from use in most commercial applications.' 0 By
the early 1970s, "use of new asbestos essentially ceased in the United

States." 11
At about the same time, manufacturers and sellers of asbestoscontaining products began to face large numbers of asbestos-related personal

injury lawsuits for exposures that occurred in earlier decades. 12 Although

several of these defendants were quite large and profitable corporations,
plaintiffs began forcing them into bankruptcy in the late 1970s and early
1980s.1 3 Few such companies remain solvent today.14
In part because use of new asbestos basically ceased, and in part because
many asbestos producers and suppliers were bankrupted fairly quickly, most
fade.' 5 That
observers believed that the asbestos litigation eventually would
16
occurred.
has
opposite
the
has not happened. In fact, quite

8. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2003).
9. See Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, 29 C.F.R. § 1518 (1972).
10. See Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1971).
11. See In re Joint E & S Dists. Asbestos Litig.,129 B.R. 710, 737 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991),
vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), opinion modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
12. Asbestos injuries usually take a long time to manifest themselves after exposure - generally
15 to 40 years. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATION IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 5 (1984).
13. The "first wave" of asbestos bankruptcies occurred between 1978 and 1985 when seven
major asbestos manufacturers and suppliers declared bankruptcy including North American Asbestos
Corp. (1978), Johns-Manville (1982), Amatex Corp. (1982), UNR Industries (1982) (including
Union Asbestos & Rubber), Waterman Steamship Corp. (1983), Wallace & Gale Co. (1984), and
Forty-Eight Insulations (1985). The next wave occurred between 1986 and 1993, and 'involved
companies with significant asbestos liability, such as Pacor, Inc. (1986), Prudential Lines, Inc.
(1986), Standard Insulations, Inc. (1986), Gatke Corp. (1987). Nicolet (1987), Delaware Insulations
(1989), Hillborough Holdings (1989), Raytech Corp. (1989) (including Raymark Industries and
Raymark Corp.), Celotex Corp. (1990) (including Carey Canada, Panacon, Philip Carey Co., and
Smith & Kanzler), National Gypsum (1990), Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulation (1990),
Eagle Pitcher Industries (1991), and H.K. Porter (1991) (including Southern Asbestos Co. and
Southern Textile). See Mark D. Plevin & Paul W. Kalish, Where Are They Now? A History of the
Companies that Have Sought Bankruptcy Protection Due to Asbestos Claims, 17-20 MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 18 (2002).
14. See RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 49; Lisa Girion, Finns Hit Hard as Asbestos Claims Rise,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Al.
15. See Victor S. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation's Trial Judges: How the Focus

By 1991, trends in the litigation led the federal Judicial Conference to
warn of an asbestos litigation "disaster of major proportions." 7 From 1993
to 1999, the number of asbestos cases pending nationwide doubled from
100,000 to 200,000.18 As the decade closed, the Supreme Court of the
United States described the "elephantine mass"' 9 of asbestos cases in this
country2 as a "crisis. ' 20 By the end of 2000, over 600,000 people had filed
claims. '
More recently, the rate of claiming activity has accelerated, propelled in

part by well-intentioned but ultimately misguided efforts by courts to relax
procedural and substantive rules in asbestos cases to serve efficiency
concerns.22 In 2001 alone, plaintiffs filed at least 90,000 new cases.23
RAND predicts that the litigation will worsen, and that up to three million
total claims may be filed.24

Perhaps the most powerful impetus for the phenomenal increase in
asbestos cases is the explosion in the number of claims filed by unimpaired
or mildly impaired plaintiffs. 25

Early asbestos cases generally involved

plaintiffs claiming serious and often fatal injuries caused by substantial

on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 247, 248 (2000).
16. See Michael Freedman. The Tort Mess, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 95, available at 2002 WL
2214449; Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Estimates Claims Associated With U.S. Asbestos Exposure Will
Ultimately
Cost
$200
Billion,
at
<http://www.towers.con/towers/webcache/towers/United-Kingdom/press-releases/2001 06 13/20
01 06 l.html> (June 13. 2001) ("Although most thought that the claims would have trailed off by
now, the number of plaintiff filings has increased dramatically, with 50,000 to 60,000 claims filed
against some defendants in the last year, compared to averages near 20,000 in the early to mid
1990s.").
17. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES 2 (1991) thereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
18. Edley testimony. supra note 1,at 5..
19. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). See also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., v.
Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1228 (2003) (again referring to the "elephantine mass" of asbestos cases).
20. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
21. See RAND Rep., supra note 3, at vi.
22. See Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Low of Unintended Consequences in
Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline The Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS.
L.J. 531 (200 1).Professor Francis McGovern has explained this phenomenon:
Judges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass torts through their litigation
process at low transaction costs create the opportunity for new filings. They increase
demand for new cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction costs. If you
build a superhighway, there will be a traffic jam.
Francis E. McGovern. The Defensive Use of FederalClass Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
595, 606 (1997).
23. See Alex Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits. Many by Healthy Plaintifjs. N.Y. TIMES. Apr.
10. 2002. atA I,abstract available at 2002 WL 18538000 (discussing the rise in asbestos-related
claims despite the declining exposure to asbestos since the 1970s).
24. See RAND Rep., supra note 3. at 77.
25. See Mark Behrens & Monica Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for
Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs,33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1,6 (2001).
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exposure to asbestos.26

By 1997, however, the U.S. Supreme Court

observed that "up to one half of asbestos claims are now filed by people who
have little or no physical impairment."2 7 More recent reports estimate that
up to ninety percent of new asbestos claims are filed by unimpaired or

mildly impaired plaintiffs. 28 Many of these claims are generated by forprofit screening enterprises that work closely with plaintiffs' law firms. 29
As the typical claimant has changed over the years-from a person
suffering serious, actual injury due to substantial exposure to asbestos to a
less-exposed plaintiff with no present physical injury-the targets of
asbestos lawsuits have evolved as well. As a result of the bankruptcies of
virtually all former producers and sellers of asbestos-containing products,

plaintiffs lawyers began to search for new types of defendants.30 If these
golden egg-laying "geese" (asbestos producers and sellers) were not widely
available, the lawyers reasoned, then maybe similar targets would do.
The first significant non-producer or supplier defendants appeared in the
1980s, when plaintiffs started suing companies that had purchased
businesses which at one point had sold or produced asbestos-containing

26. See Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice; Asbestos Lavyers are Pitting
Plaintiffs Who Aren't Sick Against Companies that Never Made the Stuff---and Extracting Billions
for Themselves, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 158, available at 2002 WL2190334.
27. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor. 521 U.S. 591, 631 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
28. See JENNIFER BIGGS ET AL., OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND TRENDS 3 (Dec. 2001),
available at <http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/mono-dec0lasbestos.pdf> (last visited Aug. 20,
2003) [hereinafter Biggsl; RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 20. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk,
Mental Distress. and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815 (2002).
29. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass.
1989) ("[Miany of these cases result from mass X-ray [sic] screenings at occupational locations
conducted by unions and/or plaintiffs' attorneys, and many claimants are functionally asymptomatic
when suit is filed."); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.. 129 B.R. at 748 (working- in
conjunction with unions, plaintiffs' lawyers have "arranged through the use of medical trailers and
the like to have x-rays taken of thousands of workers without manifestations of disease and then
filed complaints for those that had any hint of pleural plaque."): Lester Brickman. Law'ers' Ethics
and Fiduciao , Obligation in The Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 243, 244 (2001) ("Increased litigation activity is also facilitated by
widespread solicitation of potential claimants by use of mass advertising, "800" phone numbers, and
websites"); Parloff, supra note 26, at 154 ("Since asymptomatic cases had become valuable.
plaintiffs lawyers began seeking them out.
By the mid-1980s they were organizing mass
screenings, often with the cooperation of labor unions."); Pamela Sherrid. Looking for Some Million
Dollar Lungs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001. at 36, available at 2001 WL 30366341
("To unearth new clients for lawyers, screening firms advertise in towns with many aging industrial
workers or park X-ray vans near union halls. To get a free X-ray, workers must often sign forms
giving law firms 40 percent of any recovery. One solicitation reads: 'Find out if YOU have
MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS!').
30. See Richard B. Schmitt, Burning Issue: How Plaintiffs' Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos Into
a Court Perennial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,2001, at Al. available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2856111; Eric
Roston. The Asbestos Pit, TIME, Mar. II, 2002, at Y9. available at 2002 WL 8385920.

products. 3' To return to the metaphor, perhaps these successor corporations
could be viewed as something like golden egg-laying ducks. They were not
as much at fault as the asbestos producers and sellers because the businesses
these companies had purchased had stopped producing asbestos well before
the purchases. Like ducks and geese, however, they were at least similarsimilar enough for plaintiffs to try to attach liability to them.
Before long, the extension to corporate successors was not sufficient to
permit recovery by the increasing volume of claimants. The resulting search
for new "deep pockets" caused ever more peripheral defendants with little

connection to asbestos or plaintiffs' injuries to be pulled into the litigation.32
Plaintiffs' lawyers began suing defendants merely because they had used
products that contained some form of asbestos or because they had asbestos
on their premises.33
Railroads, automobile manufacturers, soap
manufacturers, wine producers, and even the Campbell Soup Co.-to name a
few-have been named as defendants.3 4 "To name a few" is all too accurateby the early to mid-1980s, approximately 300 defendants had been named in
asbestos lawsuits;35 the number today exceeds 8,400.36
One prominent plaintiffs' lawyer candidly described the new focus on
peripheral defendants as follows:
The concept is picking low-hanging fruit. In the early days of the
litigation, you had Mansville. Mansville goes away. Next in line
are the regional distributors. If they go away, next in line are the
contractors who bought from them. If those guys disappear, there
are cases where we legitimately are suing the neighborhood
hardware store, because that's where the guy bought asbestos joint
compound, or the lumberyard where he bought asbestos shingles, or
the floor company where he bought floor tiles. They say "All of a

31. See Edley Testimony, supra note 1,at 8.
32. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 747-48 (Bankr. S.D.. N.Y. 1991)
(stating that "[a] newer generation of peripheral defendants are becoming ensnarled in the litigation"
as plaintiffs' lawyers seek "to expand the number of those with assets available to pay for asbestos
injuries."); see also 'Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation'-A Discussion with Richard
Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17-3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 19 (Mar. 1, 2002) (quoting
mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer Richard Scruggs as stating: "Flooding the courts with asbestos cases filed
by people who are not sick against defendants who have not been shown to be at fault is not sound
public policy.").
33. See Biggs, supra note 28, at 4 (recognizing the surge in lawsuits against peripheral
defendants after the bankruptcy of the major manufacturers in the 1980's and observing that "the
connection of some of the newer peripheral defendants to asbestos is not obvious"); Susan Warren,
Asbestos Quagmire: Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose Premises Contained Any Form of Deadly
Material, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at BI, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3957497; Editorial, The
Job-Eating Asbestos Blob, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A22, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3383766.
34. See Susan Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 12, 2000, at B 1,available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3025073.
35. See RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 6.
36. See The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003: Hearing on S. 1125. Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. at 3 (Jun. 4, 2003) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe,
Professor, Harvard Law School).
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sudden, why me?" One answer is: "Consider yourself lucky that we
left you alone for 20 years. Now we're higher in the tree."37
Plaintiffs have increasingly relied on the doctrine of joint liability to
move "higher in the tree" and obtain recoveries from attenuated, peripheral
defendants. The rule of joint and several liability, sometimes called joint
liability, provides that when two or more persons engage in conduct that
might subject them to individual liability and their conduct produces a
single, indivisible injury, each defendant will be liable for the total amount
of damages. 38 Although the doctrine has been judicially or legislatively
abolished in many jurisdictions, in other states it either continues to exist in
its "pure" form or in a modified form that still allows large recoveries
against some peripheral asbestos defendants.39
For example, in an October 2001 verdict in Lexington, Mississippi, the
jury apportioned eighty percent of a $25 million award between two
defendants, after all other defendants settled and dozens of potential
defendants had already declared bankruptcy.40 In another case, a New York
jury awarded $1.5 million to a man who claimed that exposure from
asbestos-containing products that he purchased from Sears, Roebuck & Co.
fifty years earlier caused him to develop cancer, even though the jury found
Sears only two percent at fault and placed the remaining responsibility on
the plaintiffs employer. 4' In one more New York case, Bendix Corp.'s
successor-in-interest was held jointly liable for a $53.5 million judgment in
2002 involving a single plaintiff, even though the jury assessed Bendix's
share of responsibility for the plaintiff's harm at only 2.35 percent. 42 Six
other defendants in the case had already declared bankruptcy.4 3
These examples make it easy to comprehend the mathematics of chainreaction bankruptcies caused by joint liability in asbestos litigation." Each

37.

Parloff, supra note 26, at 164 (quoting Oakland, California plaintiffs' attorney Steve Kazan).

38. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E. 2d 197, 204 (I1. 1983).
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17, reps. note, cmt.

a, (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)].

40. See Parloff, supra note 26, at 164.
4 1. See N. Y. Jun, Finds Sears/GE Liablefor Exposure: Awards $1.5 Million to Meso Victim, 1517 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 13 (Oct. 6, 2000).
42. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def. Bendix's Mot. to Mold the Verdict, Brown v. A, C & S
Inc., No. 120595/00 at 2 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 8. 2002).
43. See id.
44. Another interesting but troubling phenomenon is that plaintiffs' lawyers are often able to
convince jurors that peripheral defendants who were not even considered worth naming as
defendants in earlier cases were actually the guiltiest parties. For example, in one case a jury
apportioned 60 percent of an arguably unimpaired plaintiffs $25 million award to a small insulation
contractor with seemingly remote connections to the plaintiffs' claim. Scores of other perhaps more
culpable defendants had settled before trial, and dozens of other potential defendants had already
declared bankruptcy before the case went to trial. See Parloff, supra note 26, at 166.

209

new bankruptcy places "mounting and cumulative" financial weight on the
45
remaining solvent defendants, speeding their path toward Chapter I.

Furthermore, as potential plaintiffs become more aware of the likelihood of
bankruptcies, more of them may feel motivated to sue prematurely - even if

they are unimpaired - while there is still money to be had.46 These factors
have triggered a domino effect of asbestos-related bankruptcies that is
unparalleled in tort law.
To date, at least sixty-seven companies have been driven into
bankruptcy as a result of asbestos liability exposure. 47 Almost one-half of

these bankruptcies occurred within the past two years. 48 As the dominoes of
corporate bankruptcies continue to fall, the financial burden facing hundreds
of thousands (and potentially millions) of asbestos plaintiffs will lead to

financial ruin for other corporations, including those with increasingly
remote connections to asbestos. 49 This destruction harms sick plaintiffs,
defendants, the economy, and the judicial system as a whole.50
Unfortunately, unless something is done to address the crisis, no end is in

sight.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: A POLICY-DRIVEN CREATION OF THE
COURTS
The doctrine of joint and several liability (also sometimes referred to as
joint liability 51 ) in more or less its modem form can be traced to the 1771
English case of Hill v. Goodchild,52 or perhaps even earlier to Sir John
Heydon's Case in England in 1613. 53 By the early part of the 20 t century,

45. Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 392 (1993); see also Mark D. Plevin & Paul W. Kalish, What's Behind the
Recent Wave of Asbestos Bankruptcies?, 16-6 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 20 (Apr. 20, 2001).
46. See Samuel Issacharoff, Shocked: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1932 (2002) (stating that "[tihe ongoing risks of
insolvency, the search for new claimants against solvent defendants, and (paradoxically) the
prospects for either bankruptcy or some global resolution have created great pressure to file cases as
quickly as possible.").
47. See Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Two Forks in the Road of Asbestos Litigation,
18-3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 21, (Mar. 7, 2003).
48.

See STEPHEN CARROLL & DEBORAH HENSLER, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, FACTS

(2003).
49. See Engineering Firm Burns & Roe Files for Reorganization, Cites Recent Spike In Claims,
15-23 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 7 (Jan. 5, 2001).
50. See Id.
51. The doctrine may also be referred to as "joint liability." For different usages of the terms
"joint tort" and "joint tortfeasors" see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § 10, cmt. a, rptrs.
notes.
52. 98 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1771); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § A18,
cmt. a, rptrs. notes (tracing joint liability to Hill); Paul Bargren, Comment, Joint Liability:
Protection for Plaintiffs. 1994 Wis. L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1994) (providing a history of joint
liability).
53. 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1613); see also Frank Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement
(Third), Apportionment as it Affects Joint & Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 565-66 (2000)
("Joint and several liability originated over 300 years ago in the English report of Sir John Heydon's
Case").
AND FIGURES ABOUT ASBESTOS LITIGATION: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE NEW RAND STUDY
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American commentators were generally supportive of the doctrine,54 and it
became the majority rule.55
The courts fashioned joint and several liability to serve a public policy
objective. Their original justification for the doctrine was that "as between a
culpable defendant and an innocent plaintiff, the culpable defendant should
bear the full burden of the plaintiff's injuries. 56 Since the defendant was at
least somewhat at fault and the plaintiff was not at fault at all, if someone
had 7to bear a loss it was thought to be fairer for the blameworthy party to do
5

so

The all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence was an important
bulwark for this justification. 58 Contributory negligence's insistence that a
plaintiff who was partially at fault should receive nothing ensured that joint
and several liability would apply only when defendants faced blameless

plaintiffs.59 Thus, defendants facing joint and several liability were always
more morally culpable than the plaintiff, and it therefore was arguably fair to
make them bear all of the loss in that situation rather than to require a
completely blameless plaintiff to suffer the burden. 6 °
The rise of comparative fault placed a large stick in the spokes of the

initial justification for joint and several liability.6' Since under comparative
fault a plaintiff could be partially to blame herself but still recover, courts no
longer had the assurance that imposition of joint and several liability would
pit a morally blameless plaintiff against a morally blameworthy defendant.

A number of authorities, including the Prosser treatise, began noting this
problem and criticizing the continued use of joint and several liability in
comparative negligence jurisdictions. 6 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:

54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § A18, rptrs. note, cmt. a, (citing William L.
Prosser. Joint Torts and Several Liability. 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 432 (1937)); Roy D. Jackson, Jr.,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403 (1939); J. H. Wigmore, Joint.Tortfeasors
and Serverance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV.
458. 459 (1923).
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § A 18, cmt. a (noting that "only a few"
American courts resisted adopting joint liability).
56. Id. at § C21. cmt. a.
57. Id.
58. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 15.03 (4th ed. 2002).
59. See id. at §1.02.
60. Id. at § 15.04.
61. Id.
62. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 475-76 (5th ed.
1984) ("[Tihe failure to consider the negligence of all tortfeasors, whether parties or not, prejudices
the joined defendants who are thus required to bear a greater proportion of the plaintiff's loss than is
attributable to their fault."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § B 19, rptrs. note, cmt. c.;
Leonard E. Eilbacher, Comparative Fault and the Nonpartv Tortfeasor, 17 IND. L. REV. 903, 903
(1984) ("To the extent that a given legal system ignores the fault of any tortfeasor, and shifts the
financial burden from one culpable person to another, the fundamental principle of comparative fault

Apportionment of Liability ("Restatement (Third)"), completed in 1999,
agrees with these criticisms.63 It notes that the original justification for joint
and several liability is "no longer compelling," 64 and finds it "difficult to

make a compelling argument"
for pure joint and several liability since the
65
rise of comparative fault.
In response to these criticisms, some supporters of joint and several
liability began emphasizing a second policy rationale for the doctrine. They
argued that joint and several liability is justified because each liable

defendant is a full legal cause of a plaintiffs harm.66 If one is a full legal
cause, according to the argument, then that defendant should be held fully
67
responsible for all damages, regardless of whether the plaintiff was at fault.
Professor Richard Wright sets up this argument with a hypothetical
involving four tortfeasors who, acting independently of each other, each

negligently place one drop of poison in a coffee

cup.

68

In the hypothetical it

is assumed that three drops of poison are sufficient to kill the plaintiff. 69 In
such a situation, he posits, asserting that each defendant was only twenty-

five percent negligent would be inaccurate - they all were, in the eyes of the
law, complete and proximate causes of the harm.

Professor Wright's hypothetical is a bit confusing, because it asks us to
take what would intuitively seem to be intentional misconduct-four

is compromised.").
63.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (1999).

64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § C2 1,cmt. a.
65. Id. at § 10, cmt. a ("It is difficult to make a compelling argument for either a pure rule of
joint and several liability or a pure rule of several liability once comparative responsibility is in
place.").
66. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of American Law Professors in Support of Respondents,
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003) (No. 01-963) [hereinafter Norfolk
Amici Brief].
67. Id. at 11-15.
A defendant's individual full responsibility for an injury that was an actual
and proximate result of her tortious behavior is not diminished if some other
person's tortious behavior also was an actual and proximate cause of the
injury. Rather each defendant whose tortious behavior was an actual and
proximate cause of the injury is individually fully responsible for the entire
injury. This is most obvious when a defendant's tortious behavior was either
necessary or independently sufficient for the occurrence of the injury, but it
remains true whenever a defendant's tortious behavior was an actual and
proximate cause of the injury.
Id. at 12-13.
Richard Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint Liability, 23 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 45, 54 (1992).
68. See Norfolk Amici Brief, supra note 66, at 7. Professor Wright also presents a different
version of the hypothetical (one in which any one of the defendants' independent drops of poison
would have been enough to kill the plaintiff) in Wright, Logic and Fairness, supra note 67, at 59.
Professor Wright's hypothetical is also discussed in an article by Professor Stuart M. Madden,
Selected FederalTort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through The Lenses Of Corrective Justice
and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1077 (1998), and is mentioned in a footnote in Richard
Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and The Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and Causal
Sufficiency, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90 n.28 (2001).

69. See Norfolk Amici Brief, supra note 66, at 7. This differs from Professor Wright's earlier
version of the hypothetical, in which any one drop of the poison would be sufficient to cause death.
See supra note 67.
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tortfeasors each putting a drop of poison in someone's coffee-and to assume
that each tortfeasors' conduct is negligent. If the conduct were intentional,
as one would suppose under these facts, responsibility would be much easier
to accept-intentional conduct has long been used in tort law as a basis to
extend a defendant's liability. Also, the hypothetical does not address the
moral dilemma raised when a plaintiff herself negligently contributes to her
harm. Of course our desire to impose full liability on each defendant would
be tempered if we learned that one of the people putting poison in the coffee
was the plaintiff herself. Professor Wright accepts the notion that plaintiffs
should be responsible for their own percentage of fault,7 ° but the key point of
plaintiff fault-which is the foundation of the post-comparative negligence
decline of joint and several liability-does not make it into the hypothetical.
Defending with precise logic the exact amount of twenty-five percent
liability for each party might remain difficult in the context of a plaintiff
adding one of the drops herself, but our rough sense of justice might lead us
to adopt some basis for allocation-even if it is not perfect-to prevent the
unfairness of a plaintiff adding to her harm and yet avoiding all
responsibility. Since each party provided twenty-five percent of the poison,
there is at least some intuitive basis for assigning that amount of
responsibility to each party.
Further, once the door to assigning percentages of liability among the
parties has been opened in response to accepting a general decision to
consider plaintiff's own fault as a factor that may reduce recovery rather
than necessarily eliminating it; on an intuitive level, that door is difficult to
close again in situations such as asbestos where the plaintiff is typically not
contributorily negligent. One could make a reasoned argument, as some
scholars have, that comparative negligence primarily presents challenges to
joint and several liability in cases where plaintiffs are partly to blame for
their harm, but perhaps that is a little bit like the pleas of the Great and
Powerful Oz not to pay any attention to the man behind the curtain. Now
that courts and, perhaps more to the point, legislatures, have been allowed to
see multiple party liability in terms of a percentage basis, it is asking a lot to
implore them only to do so in some, but not all, of the situations in which
multiple responsible parties are involved.
Perhaps in part because of these difficulties, this second effort at
justifying joint and several liability in the era of comparative responsibility
has not halted the courts' trend away from the traditional doctrine. Although
the Restatement (Third) notes the development of the second proposed
justification, the Reporters nevertheless conclude that, since the advent of
comparative responsibility, pure joint and several liability is difficult to

70. See Wright, supra note 67, at 72-78.
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defend. 7' Indeed, fifteen jurisdictions have abolished (or virtually abolished)
joint and several liability altogether,72 either judicially

legislation.74

73

or through

One of the courts that judicially abolished the doctrine

explained:
Our adoption of comparative fault is due largely to considerations
of fairness: the contributory negligence doctrine unjustly allowed
the entire loss to be borne by a negligent plaintiff, notwithstanding
that the plaintiff's fault was minor in comparison to defendant's.
Having thus adopted a rule more closely linking liability and fault,
it would be inconsistent to simultaneously retain a rule, joint and
several liability, which may fortuitously impose a degree of liability
that is out of all proportion to fault.75
In addition to the jurisdictions that have abolished joint and several

liability altogether, most other jurisdictions have in some significant way
acted to limit the doctrine. Several jurisdictions only allow the doctrine to

apply when defendants have some threshold level of liability (e.g., joint and
several liability applies only to defendants who are at least fifty percent at
fault); 76 several jurisdictions reallocate the share of an insolvent or immune

71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § C20. cmt. a. The reporters seem to favor
retaining a modified form of joint liability that would reallocate the share of an insolvent or immune
party to the remaining responsible parties (including the plaintiff if the plaintiff is comparatively at
fault) in proportion to their share of liability. See id.
72. See id. at § B18, rptrs. note, cmt. a, § 17, rptrs. note, cmt. a (table).
73. See Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696
S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985); Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 586 (N.M 1982);
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992); Volz v. Ledes, 895 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1995):
cf. Anderson v. O'Donoghue. 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983) (abolishing joint liability where plaintiff
was at fault); Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 840 P.2d 860 (Wash. 1992) (abolishing joint liability
where plaintiff was at fault). But see Boyles v. Okla. Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980)
(retaining joint liability for innocent plaintiffs).
74. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Miche 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2506 (West 2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-8 (Michie 2002); LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 1804, 2323, 2324 (West 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.10 (2002); N.D. CENT CODE
§ 32-03.2-02 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (2002): WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(e) (Michie 2002); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803 (Michie 2002)
(abolishing joint liability with exception for violation of any state or federal law or regulation related
to hazardous or toxic waste or substances or solid waste disposal sites, or any cause of action arising
from the manufacture of any medical devices or pharmaceutical products); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.182 (Michie 2002) (codifying prior court decision eliminating joint liability); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 600.6304(4), 600.6312 (West 2002) (abolishing joint liability except in medical
malpractice cases or criminal conduct involving gross negligence or the use of drugs or alcohol);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 2002) (abolishing joint liability except in strict liability cases,
cases involving vicarious liability, or "situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a
sound basis in public policy."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie 2002) (abolishing joint
liability except in strict liability or toxic or hazardous substance cases).
75. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58.
76. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2002) (permitting various levels of recovery
under joint liability depending on defendant's level of fault); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 2002)
(abolishing joint liability for economic damages for defendants less than 50% at fault); MINN. S.F.
872 (2003) (abolishing joint liability for defendants that are 50% or less at fault); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:15-5.3 (West 2002) (abolishing joint liability for defendants less than 60% at fault); N.H. REV.
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party to the remaining responsible parties (including the plaintiff, if the
plaintiff is comparatively responsible) in proportion to their share of
liability;77 several jurisdictions only apply joint and several liability to
certain types of damages (e.g., allowing joint and several liability for
economic damages but not for noneconomic damages); 8 and a few
jurisdictions only apply joint and several liability where plaintiffs are not at
fault.7 9

80
Only fifteen jurisdictions still apply full joint and several liability.
Some of these states, however, have particularly heavy asbestos caseloads,
such as Maryland, Massachusetts and West Virginia. Thus, as peripheral
asbestos litigation defendants have learned, joint and several liability
remains a potent issue in asbestos litigation.

I1. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY TO APPLY TO ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The common law rule courts developed to serve important policy
concerns in the harsh era of contributory negligence has, in the present
context of litigation, created a public policy disaster. Viewing the matter
from a broader perspective, with the demise of contributory negligence, joint
and several liability in all contexts is increasingly controversial and under
assault. The many jurisdictions that have through legislation or judicial

STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e (Michie 2002) (abolishing joint liability for defendants less than 50% at fault);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15.1 (Michie 2002) (limiting joint liability to two times the
percentage of fault of any defendant found to be less than 50% at fault); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 33.013 (2002) (abolishing joint liability except for defendants found to be more than
50% at fault, or 15% at fault in toxic tort cases); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.22.070(1)(B) (West
2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1 ) (West 2002) (abolishing joint liability for defendants found to
be less than 51% at fault); see also W.V. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9 (Michie 2002) (abolishing joint
liability for defendants found to be less than 25% at fault in medical malpractice cases).
77. See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 2002).
78. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2; IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,
185.10: N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 1601-1602 (West/Deering 2002) (abolishing joint liability for
noneconomic damges for defendants less than 50% at fault in certain cases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.19 (West/Anderson 2002) (abolishing joint liability for noneconomic damages when the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent or impliedly assumed the risk that caused the harm).
79. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33; Mo. STAT. § 537.067; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 23, § 13/5;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(l)(B); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § 17,
rptrs. note, cmt. a (table). Some of the jurisdictions have adopted combinations of the limitations
cited above. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (abolishing joint liability for noneconomic
damages and abolishing joint liability for economic damages when the defendant is less than 50% at
fault).
80. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts. Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia (with exception for medical malpractice actions in which
defendant is found to be less than 25% at fault, see W.V. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, at § 17. rptrs. note, cmt. a (table).
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decisions abolished or limited the doctrine provide ample evidence that the
honeymoon with pure joint and several liability is waning.
In the most disruptive national arena of litigation during the transition to
the twenty-first Century-asbestos lawsuits increasingly focusing on
peripheral defendants-joint and several liability is uniquely destructive and
thus merits greater scrutiny than when the doctrine is applied to other types
of cases. Several factors combine to make the doctrine uniquely pernicious
in peripheral defendant asbestos cases.
First, since the use of asbestos was essentially discontinued decades ago,
asbestos litigation presents especially difficult challenges in determining fair
risk distributions between potential defendants. In cases where the product
was last sold decades ago, witnesses may be deceased, documents may no
longer exist, and memories may be faded. Fairly apportioning liability
among peripheral defendants whose businesses were not focused on asbestos
products is a special challenge. 8'
Second, the extremely large numbers of plaintiffs and the size of the
judgments involved make joint and several liability unique in peripheral
defendant asbestos cases. The failed policies of courts trying to quickly
resolve asbestos claims by easing procedural and substantive limitations
opened the litigation floodgates for unimpaired and mildly impaired
plaintiffs, creating enormous financial strains. 82 As asbestos producers and
suppliers crumbled under the weight of the litigation, unimpaired and mildly
impaired plaintiffs who might have otherwise held off on filing claims began
to file rushed lawsuits before the available money had been exhausted.8 3
The chain reaction of bankruptcies then began in earnest, with the horde of
plaintiffs moving further and further away from the core of original
84
defendants primarily responsible for asbestos with each new bankruptcy.
A. Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Cause ParticularlySignificant Societal Harm
in the Context of Asbestos Litigation
The domino-effect of corporation after corporation being forced into
bankruptcy presents the most strikingly unique aspect of current asbestos
litigation. This context makes joint and several liability a much more
powerful doctrine than it is in typical tort cases. For example, a study of
Wisconsin personal injury trials in 1985 and 1986 found joint and several
liability applied in only 1.6 percent of the cases. 85 A national study
performed in the early 1990s found joint and several liability applied in a

81. See, e.g., N.Y. Jur Finds Sears/GE Liable for Exposure; Awards $1.5 Million to Meso
Victim, 15-17 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 13 (discussing case in which the jury awarded $1.5

million to an individual who claimed that exposure from asbestos-containing products that he
purchased from Sears fifty years earlier caused him to develop cancer) (emphasis in original).
82. See supra notes II through 23 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 30 through 32 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 31 through 38 and accompanying text.
85. See JOINT LIABILITY: THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE, STATE BAR OF Wis. 2 (1989);
Bargren, supra note 52, at 473-74.
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similarly miniscule percentage of cases.86 Thus, one could argue that in
most categories of cases concerns about the effects of joint and several
liability might be overstated.
This is not the case in the present state of asbestos litigation. In part
because most asbestos claims now involve at least one and often several
bankrupt potential defendants, reliance upon joint and several liability,
where it is permitted, is the rule rather than the exception.87 For example,
RAND recently found that by the late 1990s, "nontraditional" defendants
(i.e., defendants not involved in asbestos mining, manufacturing, or the
distribution or installation of asbestos insulation) "accounted for about sixty
percent of asbestos expenditures."88
"In contrast, in the early 1980s
'traditional'
defendants
accounted
for about three-quarters
of
expenditures., 89 Whatever flaws might exist in joint and several liability are
thus magnified by the scope of its impact in current asbestos litigation. In
this field the doctrine has particularly sharp teeth.
The individual and societal harm caused as the domino-effect
bankruptcies in asbestos litigation extends more and more toward peripheral
defendants is another factor that makes joint and several liability unique in
the asbestos litigation context. Chapter 11 bankruptcies impose direct and
indirect costs on at least three entities: (1) the firm declaring bankruptcy; (2)
other firms in that industry that have not (yet) declared bankruptcy; and (3)
society as a whole.
As the recent RAND study indicates, the "costs of bankruptcy
reorganization [in the asbestos litigation context] can be substantial." 90
These direct costs may include expenses such as attorneys' fees, bankruptcy
fees (i.e., accountants), and administrative costs. 9' According to most
estimates, these direct costs total generally about one percent to three
percent of a firm's value. 92 In asbestos-related bankruptcies, however, they
may be higher because of the massive numbers of tort creditors.93

86. See Joan T. Schmit et al., An Analysis of Litigation Claiming Joint and Several Liability, 58
J. RISK & INS. 397 (1991); Bargren, supra note 52, at 474. The national study used the Lexis
database to study 130,000 federal and state cases from 1963-88, and found only 0.13 percent
discussing joint and several liability in a non-contract setting. Id.
87. See supra notes 31 through 37 and accompanying text.
88. RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 50.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 72.
91. See Leonard J. Long, Bankruptcy Lessons of Future Mass Tort Claims: Potential Mass Tort
Victims Should Have Catastrophic Injury Insurance, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 357, 376-77 (1997)
("[Bankruptcy] is a battle over what the economists classify as 'transaction costs,' and is essentially
a battle over attorneys fees. That is,
it is a contest amongst lawyers (and their 'hanger-ons' [such as
accountants]) over shares of other people's money.").
92. See Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437,
476 (1992) (citing Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of

Furthermore, attorneys' fees are not only expended after bankruptcy has
been declared. Firms attempting to stave off bankruptcy or other financial
harm incur substantial expenses defending against bankruptcy claims.
RAND has noted that recent asbestos litigation developments are likely to
drive up transaction costs potentially for a long period of time; the study
focuses on litigation expenses as an important element in the increase.94 As
plaintiffs' lawyers become more aggressive in relying on novel arguments
for attaching liability to peripheral defendants, these defendants are
responding with increasingly aggressive - and costly - defense strategies.95
The indirect costs of asbestos-related bankruptcies are more difficult to
measure than direct costs, but they may be even higher. These costs may
include loss of customers, interruption of supply, damage to reputation,
managerial distraction, and employee turnover. 96 One significant indirect
cost that may be particularly high in asbestos-related bankruptcies stems
from the long wait typically required to pay claimants. The length of time a
business stays in bankruptcy reorganization is "critically important" to
whether the business will successfully re-emerge, because during that time
"management incentives are inappropriate, professional fees accrue at a
rapid rate, and business uncertainties increase."97
RAND found that among eleven major asbestos defendant bankruptcies
it analyzed, the average length of time from petition to confirmation was six
years. 98 One bankruptcy took ten years. 99 It takes even longer to actually
pay claimants. For example, Johns-Manville filed its bankruptcy petition in
1982, and its petition was confirmed six years later, in 1988.'0° Payments
were halted in 1990, and did not resume again until 1995 - thirteen years
after the bankruptcy petition was filed.""' According to the Manville
trustees, a "disproportionate amount of Trust settlement dollars have gone to
the least injured claimants-many with no discernible asbestos-related
physical impairment whatsoever.' ' 101023 The Trust is now paying out five cents
on the dollar to asbestos claimants.

Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 285-89 (1990)) (estimating direct costs for publicly held
firms at three percent of assets): Edward 1. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the
Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984) (average of direct bankruptcy cost to value
of the company ratio for publicly held companies was six percent)).
93. See RAND Rep., supra note 3. at 72.
94. See id. at 61.
95. See id. at 61,68.
96. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., THE IMPACT OF ASBESTOS LIABILITIES ON WORKERS IN
BANKRUPT FIRMS 23 (Sebago Assoc., Dec. 2002) [hereinafter STIGLITZ STUDY] (observing that
"bankruptcies can destroy the organizational capital associated with the firm").
97. Lynn M. LoPucki. The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 729. 729 (1993).
98. See RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 68.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Queena Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets Are Reduced As the Medically Unimpaired
File Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29680683.
103. See Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest See Payouts
Shrink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at AI, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3392934.
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An especially harmful consequence of long bankruptcies in the asbestos
context is the additional pressure put on non-bankrupt defendants. This may
contribute significantly to furthering the domino effect of more and more
asbestos-related bankruptcies.
The RAND study noted that because
bankruptcy stays litigation against bankrupt defendants, "a considerable sum
of money for paying asbestos claims has been 'taken off the table."" 4 This
has led plaintiffs' attorneys to demand more money from solvent defendants,
and to develop new legal theories to bring additional solvent defendants into
°
the litigation.'O
Another indirect bankruptcy cost that is more significant in asbestos
bankruptcies than in most other types of bankruptcies influences entire
industries against whom asbestos claims are flourishing.
The more
businesses in a particular industry are forced to resort to bankruptcy, the
more cautious lenders must be for other businesses in that industry.'0 6
Businesses thus find it harder to obtain necessary loans, and the loans they
obtain may come with higher interest rates.
The human costs associated with Chapter 11 bankruptcies are also
substantial. In publicly traded corporations, one study found that only eight
percent of managers remained with the corporation one year after a
confirmed reorganization plan was developed. 0 7 Most of the managers were
able to find other jobs, but not nearly at the same salary: the average
individual financial loss per manager over time was $1.3 million dollars.'0 8
Not surprisingly, the managers suffered psychological effects from the
experience, including suicide.' 9
Employees, managers and other businesses all suffer ripple effect losses
when a corporation declares bankruptcy.
Examples abound, and
highlighting the details of two may be illustrative. When Webvan Group,
Inc. declared Chapter 1I bankruptcy in 2001, it terminated employees with
no severance pay, its landlord lost $4.7 million, and some corporate

104. RAND Rep., supra note 3, at 68.

105. See id. In response, defendants have reported facing higher costs to resolve asbestos claims
than they anticipated, and they have reported resorting to more aggressive - and thus more expensive
- defense strategies. See id.
106. See Enron Headed Toward Bankruptcy Filing, Which May Leave Smaller Energy Companies
With a Tough Time Getting Loans (Nat'l Public Radio, Nov. 30, 2001).

107. See Warren, supra note 92, at 450 (citing Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity's
Bargaining Power and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter II Bankruptcies II (Mar. 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
108. See id. (citing Stuart C. Gibson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN.

ECON. 241. 254 (1989)).
109. See id. (citing Gibson. supra note 108, at 252); see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST
FOR LAWYERS (1989) (citing as one of the "ten lies about Chapter II" that managers will not be
attacked personally - in reality managers are vilified and humiliated).

investors lost over $1 million dollars.)' 0
Similarly, when the Fresno,
California corporation UpRight, Inc. declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
2001, it layed off 800 employees without notice.'1 But the bankruptcy did
not just harm managers and employees. Hydratech, Inc., a corporation that
did substantial business with Upright, also suffered dramatic losses. A
strong percentage of Hydratech's sales were to UpRight, and, not
surprisingly given the bankruptcy, UpRight owed Hydratech a substantial
sum of money." 12 Within two weeks of UpRight's filing of a bankruptcy
petition, Hydratech was forced to lay off almost two-thirds of its employees,
and imposed a ten percent pay cut on its remaining employees.'
The numbers of jobs lost due to asbestos-related bankruptcies dwarf
these other illustrations. A study released in December 2002 by Columbia
Professor and Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and two
colleagues found 60,000 lost jobs due to asbestos-related bankruptcies as of
December 2002.114 The study estimated the total economic cost associated
with this displacement at between $1.4 billion and $3 billion." 5 To cite a
few examples, Federal-Mongul and U.S. Gypsum, both of which filed for
bankruptcy in 2001, announced layoffs of 1,100 and 500 workers,
respectively, that year. 16 In the three years before filing for bankruptcy in
2000, Owens Coming let 1,500 workers go." 7 Absent a significant change
in the litigation's direction, the overall dollar costs and human costs will,
without doubt, become much higher over time.
Chapter 11 bankruptcies can also destroy or impair the retirement assets
and life-savings of thousands of employees, such as union workers, who are
even less able than corporate managers to make up for their losses. The
Enron bankruptcy and its devastating effect on employee-shareholders'
retirement funds drew national attention to this dilemma," 8 but of course the
problem does not only plague notorious bankruptcies such as Enron's.
Rather, the public only hears about it in such cases." 9 The Stiglitz study

110. See Carol Emert, Eating Their Losses, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 2001, at BI, available at 2001
WL 3408529.
111. See Ron Trujillo, 138 Valley Jobs Slashed - UpRight Closure Forces Hydratech to Cut Costs
- and Jobs, FRESNO BEE, June 15, 2001, at C 1.
112. Id. UpRight accounted for almost 50 percent of Hydratech's overall sales, and owed
Hydratech more than $1.4 million. Id.
113. See id.
114. See STIGLITZ STUDY, supra note 96, at 26.

115. See id. at 29.
116. See id. at 24-25.
117. See id.
118.

See Albert B. Crenshaw, Ruling Unravels Deal on Enron Pensions, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,

2002, at E6, available at 2002 WL 17587646 (reporting that 20,000 Enron employees had invested
$1.3 billion in the company's 401 (k) plan, which became "essentially worthless" with the company's
bankruptcy); Albert B. Crenshaw, Retirees, Workers Assail Enron on 401(k) Freeze; Witnesses
Challenge Firm on Length of Halt in Stock Trading, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001 at El 2, available at

2001 WL 31543794 (reporting that Enron employees Janice Farmer and Charles Prestwood lost
$700,000 and $1.3 million, respectively, in retirement savings).
119. See, e.g., Diane Stafford, Finding a Job is a Full-time Endeavor, K.C. STAR, Jan. 9, 2003,

available at 2003 WL 4021982 (reporting on the case of a 54-year-old executive secretary and other
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found that asbestos bankruptcies had inflicted "substantial, albeit perhaps
not devastating, costs on workers' [pension wealth].' 120 The study estimated
that "the average worker 121
at a bankrupted firm with a 401(k) plan suffered
roughly $8,300 in losses."'
Finally, many of the difficulties and challenges presented by asbestos

bankruptcies are even harder on small corporations, which are increasingly
being named as asbestos defendants. As stated, the length of time a business
stays in bankruptcy reorganization is "critically important" to whether the
business will ultimately survive reorganization. 122 Unfortunately, smaller

corporations usually stay in reorganization longer than larger corporations. 2 3
Further, small corporation bankruptcies are getting longer. 124 Thus, not
surprisingly, the costs of bankruptcy tend to be much higher for smaller

firms. One study indicated that costs of bankruptcy totaled twenty percent
of the Chapter 11 distribution in small firms, compared with two to six

percent of the distribution in larger firms. 125 In part because of these larger
costs, surviving Chapter 11 bankruptcy is much more rare for small
corporations than for large corporations.2 6 Because asbestos lawsuits are
now starting to involve smaller peripheral defendants, the harm will be even
worse than it was when the litigation focused on large businesses with

substantial responsibility for plaintiffs' harms.
B. The Casefor Treating Joint and Several Liability Uniquely in Peripheral
Defendant Asbestos Litigation

Joint and several liability was created by courts in response to public
policy concerns. Accordingly, where the doctrine is no longer serving

employees who lost their jobs and retirement savings upon the sale of the business during Chapter I I
bankruptcy proceedings).
120. STIGLrrZ STUDY, supra note 96, at 43.
121. Id. at 43. According to the study, "[flor a 45-year old worker with an average 401(k)
balance, such a loss would mean his retirement income would fall by $1,250 per year." Id.
122. See LoPucki, supra note 97 and accompanying text.
123. See LoPucki, supra note 97, at 745 (finding that the time for reorganization for small
companies more than doubled after the adoption of Chapter II in 1978).
124. See id.
125. See Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in
Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847, 876-78 (based on study of 57 small firm
bankruptcies filed in Memphis that were completed in 1991 and 1992).
126. See Warren, supra note 92, at 444 (stating that "[olnly about 17% of all Chapter I I cases
manage to confirm a plan of reorganization, while nearly 90% of publicly traded companies survive
to confirm a plan.") (citing ED FLYNN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 11,at 10-11 (1989) (estimating a 17% confirmation rate for all Chapter I I
filings)); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 411, 441 n. 105
(finding confirmation rate of 89-96% among biggest cases filed during 1979-88)).

public policy in a particular context, courts and legislatures should change
the law. Asbestos presents such a situation. Courts can change joint and
several liability rules under the traditional common law process. Respected
courts have already done so. 12 7 Legislatures also have the power to create
and modify tort law doctrine. Regardless of the public policy debate as to
whether joint and several liability should be abolished in general, asbestos
liability is one situation where the arguments for limiting or abolishing the
doctrine are especially strong.
Limitations developed by courts or legislatures for asbestos cases could
take several approaches. For example, joint and several liability could be
abolished for asbestos lawsuits. Another approach would be to establish a
responsibility minimum (e.g., fifty percent) to allow the doctrine to operate
against certain asbestos defendants - as stated, several states already have
modified the doctrine in this fashion for all cases. 28 Or, joint and several
liability could be prohibited in cases involving unimpaired asbestos
plaintiffs. A final approach may be to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the application of joint and several liability is appropriate under the
circumstances. 129
Two brief examples help to illustrate why asbestos-specific limitations
on joint and several liability may be desirable public policy. In re Collins,130
decided in 2000 by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, focused on punitive
damages in asbestos litigation. Four asbestos plaintiffs' cases were
transferred to the federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL
Panel") which includes all asbestos personal injury litigation in the federal
courts. 131 Eventually, at the suggestion of the transferee judge, the cases
were remanded back to the transferor courts.' 32 The MDL Panel withheld
remand of the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages, as it had done in
asbestos cases throughout the 1990s. 13 3 The Collins court upheld the MDL
Panel's practice, stating that, because assets are limited in the specific
context of asbestos lawsuits, "the sick and dying, their widows and survivors
should have their claims addressed first."' 13 4 The court explained:
Although there may be grounds to support an award, multiple
judgments for punitive damages in the mass tort context against a

127. See, e.g., In Re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (refusing to
allow plaintiffs to argue a market theory of liability in asbestos cases); Greenwood v. McDonough
Power Equip., 437 F. Supp. 707 (D. Kan. 1977) (applying Kan. Law) (holding that joint and several
liability has been replaced by several liability in Kansas, and finding that the defendant had a
substantive right to have its liability gauged in proportion to its causal negligence.).
128. See supra notes 74 through 80 and accompanying text.
129. This potential approach would allow the least certainty and predictability of the approaches
mentioned, but it would also allow the most precise tailoring of the doctrine tomeet public policy
needs.
130. In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2000).
131.

Id.

132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 812 (quoting In re Petenauela, 210 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cr. 2000)).
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finite number of defendants with limited assets threaten fair
compensation to pending claimants and future claimants who await
their recovery, and threaten the economic viability of the
defendants .... Meritorious claims may go uncompensated while
earlier claimants enjoy a windfall unrelated to their actual
damages. 135
The appellate court went on to note that the resources available to
asbestos plaintiffs are "steadily being depleted", and that the rising numbers
36
of asbestos-related bankruptcies reveals that "the process is accelerating".
In this context, the court held, it is "responsible public policy to give priority
to compensatory claims over exemplary punitive damage windfalls."' 37 The
court further found it "discouraging that while the [multidistrict litigation]
Panel and transferee court follow this enlightened practice, some state courts
allow punitive damages in asbestos cases. The continued hemorrhaging of
available funds deprives current and future victims of rightful
compensation."' 38
The Collins holding does not apply to all multidistrict punitive damages
cases; its limitation applies only to asbestos cases, where unique
39
circumstances make punitive damages awards especially problematic.
Thus, Collins recognizes that adoption of an asbestos-specific rule to limit
liability is entirely appropriate where it serves public policy interests. Like
joint and several liability, punitive damages are a common law creation
designed to serve public policy. The Collins court was correct in limiting a
common law doctrine that now frustrates rather than furthers public policy in
the specific context of asbestos, and other courts should consider similarly
limiting joint and several liability in asbestos cases.
Another example is the 1984 New Jersey Supreme Court case of
Feldman v. Lederle Labs.140 For purposes of our focus, in relevant part
Feldman interpreted Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 14'another
New Jersey Supreme Court case that was decided two years earlier.
Beshada was a closely watched asbestos lawsuit against Johns-Manville, and
the court adopted the radical proposition that defendants should be held
strictly liable for risks that were unknowable at the time of sale but

135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Mark A. Behrens & Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public Policy Denmands an End to the
HemorrhagingAffect of Punitive Damages in Asbestos Cases, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 137, 149
(2001).
140. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
141. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
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discovered later. Thus, even if there was no way a seller could have known
of later-discovered risks, it will be treated as if it knew of them. Particularly
in failure to warn cases such as Beshada, this standard approaches absolute

liability for sellers. 142
Several prominent legal scholars soundly denounced Beshada in the two
years between it and the Feldman decision.143 The Feldman court noted this
criticism, and declined to apply Beshada's imputed knowledge of risks
standard to the case before it (a case involving a prescription medical
product rather than asbestos). But the court also declined to overrule
Beshada. Instead, it restricted Beshada "to the circumstances giving rise to
its holding."' 44 A later New Jersey Supreme Court case confirmed that this
limitation meant45that Beshada's extreme rule is to be applied "only in
asbestos cases.'
Feldman and Beshada are examples of courts' early approaches to the
onset of large-scale asbestos litigation. Unfortunately, their approach of
making lawsuits easier to win against asbestos defendants was both shortsighted and misguided; it invited a litigation superhighway traffic jam
involving a large number of asbestos claims.
The cases, however,
demonstrate that courts certainly have the power to make asbestos-specific
rules if they believe that doing so furthers public policy.
Indeed, the Feldman and Beshada cases are particularly appropriate
examples, because they make the point that since courts making asbestosspecific rules helped to create the current crisis in asbestos litigation, they
should not shy away from trying to solve the problem through new asbestosspecific rules. If asbestos-specific judicial expansion of the law helped
generate the crisis, asbestos-specific judicial contraction of the law may be
appropriate to help end the crisis.
IV. CONCLUSION

Courts and legislatures should make special rules for specific categories
of lawsuits only in rare circumstances. Any ad hoc or case-specific rule to
some extent engenders uncertainty, and presents the risk of giving reign to
activist judges who wish to shape the law to their individual tastes.
If there were ever a situation crying out for unique approaches to
limiting further liability, however, asbestos litigation clearly is it. The
combination of litigation on a massive scale, a history of courts treating
asbestos litigation as unique (albeit in the past to make the litigation easier
for plaintiffs), escalating bankruptcies, and the explosive increase in filings

142.

See Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of "Super Strict Liability": Common Sense Returns To

Tort Low, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 179 (1991).
143. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388 (citing five law review articles, many written by prominent
torts scholars, criticizing Beshada's imputed risks standard).
144. Id. at 388.

145. Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 982 (N.J. 1998) ("Only in asbestos cases is a
manufacturer precluded from asserting the state-of-the-art defense, despite the fact that the harms of
asbestos were not known to the scientific community at the time of manufacture.").
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by unimpaired plaintiffs is so compelling that even harsh critics of most
judicial activism should feel comfortable considering it an appropriate
option under the circumstances. In a sense this is a rare luxury for judges;
the forbidden fruit of fashioning creative judge-made law to fit a specific
situation is, in this unusual situation, healthy. Given the dismal current state
of the litigation, there are great benefits and little risk in creating asbestosspecific limitations on joint and several liability.
One might raise the concern that adopting such limitations in some
jurisdictions will contribute to forum-shopping-that the limitations will
push plaintiffs to jurisdictions where neither courts nor legislatures have
created asbestos-specific restrictions on joint and several liability. However,
forum-shopping concerns usually focus on worries about inappropriately
attracting litigants to one's jurisdiction, rather than repelling them. Courts
and legislatures cannot control whether other jurisdictions will act
appropriately to limit joint and several liability, and they should not allow
other jurisdictions' failures to prevent them from taking appropriate action.
Judicially or legislatively limiting joint and several liability in asbestos
cases is not the only solution to the asbestos crisis. For example, creating
inactive dockets to defer claims for presently uninjured claimants is a
measure that should be considered in addition to limitations on joint and
several liability. 146 Federal legislation would avoid forum shopping and
open the way for more far-reaching solutions. Given the dire circumstances,
however, courts and state legislatures should not wait for a federal solution.
As one court has stated:
[A]t some point, some jurisdiction must face up to the realities of
the asbestos crisis and take a step that, might perhaps, lead others to
adopt a broader view.
Courts should no longer wait for
congressional... action to correct common law errors made by the
courts themselves. Mistakes created by courts can be corrected by
courts without engaging in judicial activism. It is judicial
paralysis,
7
not judicial activism, that is the problem in this area.1
Limiting joint and several liability in asbestos cases is something that
courts and legislatures can and should consider undertaking immediately to

146. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the "Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Cases:
Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Orders That
Defer Claims Filed by the Non-sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2003): Peter H. Schuck,
The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
541 (1992).
147. Dunn v. Hovic, I F.3d 1371. 1399 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting), modif in part, 13 F.3d 58,
cert. denied sub nom.Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993).
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help stem the tide of unimpaired plaintiffs causing mass bankruptcies and
significant societal harm.
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